git-pr-workflows-pr-enhance
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to analyze and process external, untrusted data including pull request diffs, commit messages, and repository content.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through
git diffoutput and commit history extracted inresources/implementation-playbook.md. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit boundary markers or delimiters when interpolating change summaries into the PR description templates.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses
subprocess.runto interact with the local filesystem viagit. While the provided scripts do not perform network operations or direct file-writes, the agent's broad toolset could be leveraged if instructions are successfully injected. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering for the content of commit messages or code diffs before they are processed by the LLM.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
PRAnalyzerclass inresources/implementation-playbook.mdusessubprocess.runto execute variousgitcommands (rev-parse,diff). While it uses the list-based argument format which mitigates shell injection, it still represents a mechanism for system-level interaction based on potentially user-supplied branch names or commit SHAs. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The Python snippets use
__import__("os")to dynamically access environment variables withinsubprocess.runcalls. While used here for the benign purpose of setting the locale (LC_ALL: C), dynamic imports can be a vector for loading unexpected modules if the input is manipulated.
Audit Metadata