gitlab-automation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates reading external data from GitLab, such as issue descriptions and merge request titles, which provides an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. Ingestion points: Tools such as
GITLAB_LIST_PROJECT_ISSUES,GITLAB_GET_PROJECT_MERGE_REQUESTS, andGITLAB_LIST_REPOSITORY_COMMITS(referenced inSKILL.md). Boundary markers: There are no instructions to the agent to isolate or treat data from these tools as potentially untrusted. Capability inventory: The skill has extensive write and update capabilities, includingGITLAB_CREATE_PROJECT_ISSUE,GITLAB_UPDATE_PROJECT_ISSUE, andGITLAB_CREATE_REPOSITORY_BRANCH(referenced inSKILL.md). Sanitization: No specific data validation or sanitization requirements are defined for inputs fetched from GitLab. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill setup requires the user to configure an external MCP server endpoint at
https://rube.app/mcp. Evidence: The documentation inSKILL.mddirects users to add the service as an MCP server in their client configuration.
Audit Metadata