health-trend-analyzer
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 28, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses a wide range of highly sensitive personal files, including
data/pregnancy-tracker.json,data/menopause-tracker.json,data/mood/**/*.json, anddata/radiation-records.json. While the skill claims to operate locally, it is designed to consolidate this sensitive data into a 'sharable' HTML format, which constitutes a significant data exposure surface. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from multiple ingestion points (symptom logs, diet records, mood scores) and interpolates them into a generated HTML report. This creates a surface for Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) or indirect injection if an attacker can influence the contents of the health logs.
- Ingestion points: Multiple JSON files under
data/symptoms/,data/mood/,data/diet/, anddata/medication-logs/. - Boundary markers: The instructions explicitly tell the agent to escape
</script>tags and JSON boundaries, acknowledging the risk but relying on model compliance. - Capability inventory: The skill uses the
Writetool to create persistent HTML files. - Sanitization: Relies on instructional directives to 'escape text and JSON boundaries' rather than programmatic sanitization.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
Writetool to generate and save interactive HTML files to the local filesystem (data/health-reports/). - [PERSISTENCE]: The generated reports are saved to a dedicated directory on the disk, creating persistent artifacts that contain consolidated sensitive data.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill frontmatter includes a non-standard
risk: criticalfield, which may be an attempt to influence the agent's or analyzer's perception of its safety or priority.
Audit Metadata