hugging-face-community-evals
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts
scripts/inspect_eval_uv.py,scripts/inspect_vllm_uv.py, andscripts/lighteval_vllm_uv.pyutilizesubprocess.runto invoke external command-line utilities (inspectandlighteval). Arguments for these commands are constructed using user-provided input such as model identifiers and task names. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Both
scripts/inspect_vllm_uv.pyandscripts/lighteval_vllm_uv.pyallow the passing of a--trust-remote-codeparameter to the underlying Hugging Face libraries. This enables the execution of arbitrary Python code contained within a model's repository on the Hugging Face Hub during the evaluation process. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The script
scripts/inspect_eval_uv.pyperforms dynamic path resolution by importing theinspect_evalsmodule and using its installation path as the working directory for shell command execution. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data (model identifiers, task strings, and model outputs) and has exploitable capabilities (shell command execution).
- Ingestion points: Model IDs and task specifications provided by the user via CLI arguments; generated outputs from evaluated models (all scripts).
- Boundary markers: None. The skill lacks explicit instructions or delimiters to prevent the agent from following commands embedded within the data being processed.
- Capability inventory: Execution of system commands through
subprocess.runto callinspectandlightevalbinaries (all scripts). - Sanitization: While arguments are passed to
subprocess.runas a list to prevent shell meta-character injection, the skill does not perform validation or filtering of the model-provided content before it enters the agent's context.
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