hugging-face-trackio
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONINGEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates an autonomous workflow where an LLM agent monitors training progress via alerts and metrics, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection. \n
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent's context through
trackio list alerts --jsonandtrackio get metric --jsoncommands as defined inreferences/retrieving_metrics.md. \n - Boundary markers: No delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands are specified when the agent processes retrieved data. \n
- Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to launch background processes, adjust hyperparameters, and stop training runs based on the metrics, as described in
SKILL.md. \n - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the alert
textfield is mentioned before the agent uses it for diagnostics. \n- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill metadata contains a discrepancy between the provided author context ('sickn33') and the internal attribution to 'Hugging Face' inplugin.json. Additionally, therisk: criticaltag in theSKILL.mdfrontmatter is misleading given the skill's primary functionality. \n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of thetrackioPython package. This download targets the official repository of a trusted organization and is documented neutrally.
Audit Metadata