image-studio

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 24, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently instructs the agent to execute shell commands (e.g., python generate.py --prompt "...") using arguments directly derived from untrusted user input. This pattern is susceptible to command injection if the agent does not properly escape shell-active characters (like semicolons, backticks, or pipes) before execution.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted user data that determines the parameters of executable commands.
  • Ingestion points: User-provided image prompts, style requests, and customization parameters in SKILL.md sections 3.2 and 3.3.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; user input is directly interpolated into command-line strings without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: Execution of local Python scripts with multiple modes (generate, ultra, inpaint, upscale, remove-bg) via python generate.py in the directories C:\Users\renat\skills\ai-studio-image\ and C:\Users\renat\skills\stability-ai\.
  • Sanitization: Not present; the skill instructions lack any validation, filtering, or escaping logic for user-supplied strings used in shell interpolation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jul 24, 2026, 01:00 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — image-studio