image-studio
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently instructs the agent to execute shell commands (e.g.,
python generate.py --prompt "...") using arguments directly derived from untrusted user input. This pattern is susceptible to command injection if the agent does not properly escape shell-active characters (like semicolons, backticks, or pipes) before execution. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted user data that determines the parameters of executable commands.
- Ingestion points: User-provided image prompts, style requests, and customization parameters in
SKILL.mdsections 3.2 and 3.3. - Boundary markers: Absent; user input is directly interpolated into command-line strings without delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: Execution of local Python scripts with multiple modes (generate, ultra, inpaint, upscale, remove-bg) via
python generate.pyin the directoriesC:\Users\renat\skills\ai-studio-image\andC:\Users\renat\skills\stability-ai\. - Sanitization: Not present; the skill instructions lack any validation, filtering, or escaping logic for user-supplied strings used in shell interpolation.
Audit Metadata