incident-response-incident-response
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 23, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill heavily interpolates the
$ARGUMENTSand$SEVERITYvariables directly into natural language prompts for 13 different sub-agent calls across multiple phases. There are no boundary markers (like XML tags or delimiters) or instructions for sub-agents to ignore embedded commands within these variables. - Ingestion points: The
$ARGUMENTSvariable inSKILL.mdis sourced from user input and propagated through the entire workflow. - Boundary markers: Absent. The user-provided string is concatenated directly into urgent instructions (e.g.,
URGENT: Detect and classify incident: $ARGUMENTS). - Capability inventory: The skill coordinates sub-agents with high-privilege capabilities including deployment execution, system rollbacks, traffic rerouting, and scaling infrastructure.
- Sanitization: None present. The raw input is passed to agents responsible for sensitive tasks like
Fix ImplementationandSecurity Assessment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to perform high-impact production operations including executing emergency deployments, performing service rollbacks, and modifying traffic routing (throttling/rerouting). While these are intended for incident response, they represent significant control over the production environment.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The workflow involves querying and aggregating highly sensitive telemetry and security data, including distributed traces, log aggregation (ELK/Splunk), APM data, WAF logs, security groups, and audit trails. While no external exfiltration to unauthorized domains is observed, the data processed is highly sensitive.
Audit Metadata