Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external sources (Instagram comments and direct messages) which can be processed by the agent.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via
scripts/comments.pyandscripts/messages.py. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions were found in the scripts or documentation.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including extensive network operations (Instagram and Imgur APIs) and local file system access (SQLite database operations).
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or filtering for the data fetched from Instagram before it is provided to the agent.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: To facilitate content publishing, the skill automatically uploads local media files to Imgur, a well-known third-party hosting service. This is a functional requirement of the Instagram Graph API, which necessitates a public URL for media ingestion. This behavior is documented in the skill's overview and publishing guides.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: There is a discrepancy between the author name 'renat' listed in the SKILL.md frontmatter and the author identity 'sickn33' provided in the system context. Additionally, the skill's risk level is self-labeled as 'critical' in the frontmatter, which might be a subjective assessment of the skill's power rather than its security risk.
Audit Metadata