internal-comms
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest large volumes of untrusted or externally-sourced data from corporate communication tools (Slack, Email, Google Drive, etc.) to summarize updates or answer FAQs.
- Ingestion points:
examples/3p-updates.md,examples/company-newsletter.md, andexamples/faq-answers.mdall explicitly instruct the agent to read content from Slack channels, email threads, and shared documents. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any boundary markers (like XML tags or delimiters) or instructions to ignore embedded prompts within the retrieved data.
- Capability inventory: The skill primarily performs text processing and summarization. It does not explicitly list tools for writing to files or making network requests, but the
allowed-toolsfield is absent in the frontmatter, meaning the environment may provide these capabilities. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the retrieved text is mentioned before it is processed by the LLM.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill encourages the agent to search through sensitive communication channels (
~Slack,~Email,~Google Drive) for "critical team members," "executive announcements," and "fundraising" information. While intended for internal reporting, there is a risk that this information could be exposed if the agent is prompted maliciously or if the resulting summary is sent to unauthorized parties.
Audit Metadata