internal-comms

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest large volumes of untrusted or externally-sourced data from corporate communication tools (Slack, Email, Google Drive, etc.) to summarize updates or answer FAQs.
  • Ingestion points: examples/3p-updates.md, examples/company-newsletter.md, and examples/faq-answers.md all explicitly instruct the agent to read content from Slack channels, email threads, and shared documents.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any boundary markers (like XML tags or delimiters) or instructions to ignore embedded prompts within the retrieved data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill primarily performs text processing and summarization. It does not explicitly list tools for writing to files or making network requests, but the allowed-tools field is absent in the frontmatter, meaning the environment may provide these capabilities.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the retrieved text is mentioned before it is processed by the LLM.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill encourages the agent to search through sensitive communication channels (~Slack, ~Email, ~Google Drive) for "critical team members," "executive announcements," and "fundraising" information. While intended for internal reporting, there is a risk that this information could be exposed if the agent is prompted maliciously or if the resulting summary is sent to unauthorized parties.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 6, 2026, 06:26 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — internal-comms