jenkins
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The Kubernetes agent configuration example explicitly includes a container with
securityContext: privileged: trueto support Docker-in-Docker (dind) operations. This configuration grants the container nearly the same access as processes running on the host, which is a major security risk as it facilitates container escapes and host node compromise. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple examples demonstrate the interpolation of environment variables and build parameters directly into shell commands (e.g.,
sh "deploy.sh ${params.ENVIRONMENT}"andsh "./deploy.sh"). If these parameters or environment variables are sourced from untrusted inputs like branch names or PR metadata, they can be exploited for command injection. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill describes an automated pipeline that ingests and executes data from external, potentially untrusted sources like Git repositories.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through the
Jenkinsfilesource code, branch names (viabranch 'main'), and user-supplied parameters (params.ENVIRONMENT). - Boundary markers: The provided templates do not include delimiters or instructions to the agent to treat external data as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
shstep for arbitrary shell command execution,checkoutfor remote code retrieval, andmailfor external communication. - Sanitization: No validation or escaping of the interpolated parameters or branch conditions is present in the provided examples.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata