jira-automation
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 31, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the configuration of an external MCP server at
https://rube.app/mcp. This establishes a network dependency on a third-party service to provide the underlying tool schemas and execution environment for Jira automation. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection because it is designed to ingest and process data from Jira issues, descriptions, and comments which are often user-generated and untrusted.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through tools like
JIRA_SEARCH_FOR_ISSUES_USING_JQL_POST,JIRA_GET_ISSUE, andJIRA_LIST_ISSUE_COMMENTSdescribed inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The skill documentation lacks instructions for implementing delimiters or safety markers to isolate retrieved Jira content from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The agent is granted capabilities to modify the Jira environment, including
JIRA_CREATE_ISSUE,JIRA_EDIT_ISSUE, andJIRA_ASSIGN_ISSUE. - Sanitization: There are no specified mechanisms for sanitizing or filtering external content before it is processed by the agent.
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