json-canvas
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions require the agent to read, parse, and update existing
.canvasfiles, which serves as a vector for indirect prompt injection if the files originate from untrusted sources. - Ingestion points: Workflows for adding nodes (Workflow 2) and editing canvases (Workflow 4) in
SKILL.mdinvolve reading and parsing existing.canvasfiles from the file system. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack specific boundary markers or warnings to the agent to disregard instructions that might be embedded within the
textfields of the canvas JSON. - Capability inventory: The skill allows for writing modified JSON data back to files (Workflow 1 and 4), creating a potential write-back loop for injected content.
- Sanitization: While the skill advises validating JSON structure and ID integrity, it does not specify sanitization or filtering for the markdown content in
textnodes or the paths infilenodes.
Audit Metadata