linkedin-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to install a global NPM package
@linkedapi/linkedin-clito provide the core command-line functionality needed for LinkedIn automation. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses shell command execution to run the
linkedinCLI tool for all operations, including account setup, data retrieval, and account actions. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8) due to its data ingestion and execution flow:
- Ingestion points: Untrusted content is ingested from the external LinkedIn environment (e.g., profiles via
linkedin person fetch, messages vialinkedin message get, and posts vialinkedin post fetch). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or delimiters to isolate fetched LinkedIn content from the agent's logic, which may lead the agent to follow instructions embedded in that content.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides powerful capabilities like
linkedin message send,linkedin connection send, andlinkedin post create. These could be misused if the agent is manipulated by malicious data fetched in a previous step. - Sanitization: There are no documented steps for sanitizing or validating external data before it enters the agent's context.
Audit Metadata