loki-logging
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONINGEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data (logs), creating a surface for potential instruction injection if the agent interprets log content.
- Ingestion points: Promtail configuration and Kubernetes DaemonSet manifests define the ingestion of host logs from
/var/log/and/var/lib/docker/containers(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to distinguish between log content and operational instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes high-privilege tools including
kubectl,helm,terraform,git, and CI runners (referenced in compatibility metadata). - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering is applied to external log content before it enters the agent's context.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill displays inconsistent author information across its metadata and source references.
- Evidence: The metadata identifies the author as
devops-skills, while the source repository belongs toBagelHole, and the registered author issickn33. This inconsistency is misleading regarding the skill's origin. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches official deployment configurations from a well-known service.
- Evidence: The skill provides instructions to add the official Grafana Helm repository at
https://grafana.github.io/helm-charts(SKILL.md). - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Configuration requests access to sensitive host paths for logging purposes.
- Evidence: The Promtail configuration mounts the Docker socket (
/var/run/docker.sock) and system-wide log directories (/var/log,/var/lib/docker/containers) in SKILL.md. While standard for log aggregation, this grants the agent visibility into host and container activity.
Audit Metadata