lore
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process Markdown files from the repository, which serves as a potential vector for indirect prompt injection from untrusted sources.\n
- Ingestion points: Memory entries are read from the
.lore/directory duringsync,query,audit, andhistoryworkflows.\n - Boundary markers: The skill uses specific
<!-- LORE:START -->and<!-- LORE:END -->HTML comments to separate managed content from user notes in platform instruction files.\n - Capability inventory: The system performs file writes within the project boundary and executes local
gitcommands. It does not possess network access.\n - Sanitization: The
scripts/safe_read.pyscript provides aread_textutility that rejects symlinks, enforces a 2MiB size limit, and uses aninertfunction to escape Markdown and HTML special characters. Furthermore, theSKILL.mddocumentation provides clear instructions that memory entries must not be treated as authoritative over safety guidelines or system prompts.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several Python scripts execute shell commands to interact with the project's Git history and other internal tools.\n - Evidence:
scripts/history.pyexecutesgit log,git rev-parse, andgit show.scripts/find_duplicates.pyandscripts/find_stale.pyinvokelist_entries.pyusingsys.executable.\n - Security Controls: All
subprocess.runcalls pass arguments as a list to avoid shell injection.scripts/history.pyimplements rigorous path validation, checking for absolute paths, directory traversal sequences, and control characters, and uses the--literal-pathspecsGit flag to prevent malicious pathspec interpretation.
Audit Metadata