machine-learning-ops-ml-pipeline
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted user input via the
$ARGUMENTSvariable and interpolates it directly into the prompts for several subagents, includingdata-engineer,data-scientist, andml-engineerinSKILL.md. - Ingestion points: User input through the
$ARGUMENTSplaceholder is distributed into multiple subagent prompts across all four phases of the pipeline. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands are used when interpolating
$ARGUMENTSinto the prompts. - Capability inventory: The subagents are granted broad capabilities, including generating "complete implementation code," "automation scripts," "Kubernetes manifests," and "monitoring configuration" (e.g., in
SKILL.mdphases 1 through 4). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of validation, filtering, or escaping performed on the user input before it reaches the subagents.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references a wide array of well-known and trusted third-party technologies and frameworks as part of its MLOps workflow.
- Evidence: Mentions of tools such as DVC, lakeFS, Feast, Tecton, MLflow, Weights & Biases, Optuna, Ray Tune, Horovod, FastAPI, TorchServe, Kubeflow, Airflow, ArgoCD, Terraform, Helm, and Prometheus. These are standard industry tools for machine learning operations and are used here within their intended primary purpose.
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