malware-analyst
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is explicitly designed to process untrusted data in the form of malware samples (e.g.,
sample.exe). Analyzing the output of tools likestringsor metadata from these files presents a surface for indirect prompt injection if the samples contain malicious instructions targeted at the LLM. - Ingestion points: Untrusted file samples (
sample.exe) processed viastrings,file, andrabin2(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None present in the instructions to separate untrusted data from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: Execution of command-line tools such as
file,sha256sum,strings,diec,exeinfope,rabin2, anddumpbin(SKILL.md). - Sanitization: No mention of escaping or sanitizing tool outputs before processing by the agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill contains multiple command-line examples for file analysis and identification. While these are standard forensic tools, they involve executing subprocesses on the host system.
- Evidence: Use of
file,sha256sum,strings,diec,exeinfope,rabin2, anddumpbinin SKILL.md. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill documents numerous persistence mechanisms used by malware, such as Registry Run keys (
HKCU/HKLM\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run), Scheduled tasks (schtasks), and Service creation (sc.exe). While listed for identification purposes, these are high-risk operations. - Evidence: Detailed list under the 'Persistence Mechanisms' section in SKILL.md.
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The analysis workflow includes techniques that typically require administrative privileges, such as modifying services, scheduled tasks, and accessing system-level registry keys.
- Evidence: References to
sc.exe,schtasks, and HKLM registry paths in SKILL.md.
Audit Metadata