mcp-builder
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 6, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/evaluation.pyandscripts/connections.pyfiles utilize themcplibrary to launch local MCP servers. This involves executing shell commands provided as arguments (e.g., via the-cand-aflags) to start the server process using standard input/output streams. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The evaluation harness in
scripts/evaluation.pyprocesses responses from external MCP servers. These responses are incorporated into the agent's context to facilitate multi-step task completion and evaluation. If an MCP server returns malicious instructions, it could potentially influence the evaluator agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: The
agent_loopfunction inscripts/evaluation.pyreceives data from thecall_toolmethod which communicates with external servers. - Boundary markers: The skill relies on standard
tool_resultmessage structures but does not implement additional sanitization or explicit safety boundary markers for the returned content. - Capability inventory: The evaluator agent has the ability to call any tool exposed by the MCP server being tested, which may include network or file system access.
- Sanitization: None observed; tool outputs are treated as data to be evaluated and may be directly appended to the conversational history.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions and implementation guides fetch documentation and SDK information from official Model Context Protocol repositories on GitHub (modelcontextprotocol organization).
Audit Metadata