molykit
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONINGINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's description uses the 'CRITICAL:' prefix, which is a common pattern for attempting to override agent instructions or bypass safety filters by masquerading as a high-priority system directive.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The YAML frontmatter includes a non-standard 'risk: critical' field. This is an attempt to inject a security classification or status into the skill's metadata, potentially to deceive automated scanners or influence the agent's perception of the skill's authority.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the ingestion and processing of untrusted data from external LLM providers via Server-Sent Events (SSE) streaming.
- Ingestion points: The
parse_ssefunction inSKILL.mdprocesses raw byte streams from external network requests. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or 'ignore embedded instructions' warnings are present in the provided code snippets to distinguish between instructions and data.
- Capability inventory: The skill includes a
spawn()utility for background task execution and usesCx::post_actionfor UI state updates based on the ingested content. - Sanitization: No logic for sanitizing or escaping the content from the LLM stream is demonstrated before the content is passed to UI components or application state.
Audit Metadata