monte-carlo-prevent
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill references the use of the
montecarlocommand-line interface, specifically for applying monitor configurations (montecarlo monitors apply). - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically generates content at runtime, including YAML monitor definitions (Workflow 2) and SQL validation queries (Workflow 5), which are saved to local project files.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation suggests a
curlcommand tohttps://integrations.getmontecarlo.com/mcp/as a troubleshooting step to verify connectivity to the official Monte Carlo integration endpoint. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted SQL files and dbt models to generate reports and queries.
- Ingestion points: Reads
.sqlfiles and dbt models from themodels/directory as specified inSKILL.mdandworkflows.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not define specific delimiters to isolate untrusted SQL content from the instructions.
- Capability inventory: Performs file writes to the
monitors/andvalidation/directories, executes shell commands via themontecarloCLI, and initiates network requests through themonte-carloMCP server (referenced inSKILL.mdandworkflows.md). - Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the ingested SQL code before it is used to construct impact reports or validation queries.
Audit Metadata