okta-attack
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous shell commands and bash scripts designed to perform active network operations and authentication probes.
- Evidence includes loops for tenant subdomain guessing using
curland DNS lookups viadigto identify target infrastructure. - User enumeration and password spraying scripts target the Okta
/api/v1/authnendpoint, demonstrating active credential probing. - OIDC and SAML configuration testing involve active redirection tampering and metadata extraction.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references a third-party offensive security tool hosted on a community GitHub repository.
- Evidence: Reference to
OktaTerrifyatgithub.com/silverhack/OktaTerrifyin the Tooling section. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and processing untrusted data from external sources during analysis.
- Ingestion points: DNS CNAME records fetched via
digand HTTP API responses (JSON/HTML) fetched viacurlfrom Okta tenant endpoints in the discovery and enumeration sections. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement specific delimiters or "ignore instructions" markers when interpolating external responses into the agent's context.
- Capability inventory: Includes shell command execution (
curl,dig,python3) and file reading (cat scope.txt) which could be abused if an injected instruction is followed. - Sanitization: External content is piped to formatting tools like
json.toolor displayed to the agent/user without explicit validation or sanitization of the content for embedded instructions.
Audit Metadata