opencode-delegate

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 10, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates an orchestration loop where the orchestrator agent ingests and acts on data produced by an external implementer (OpenCode CLI), creating a potential for indirect prompt injection attacks.
  • Ingestion points: The orchestrator reads implementation results from result.json (specifically the finalMessage and touchedFiles fields) and file diffs in the working tree.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions recommend structured briefs using XML tags (e.g., <task>, <verification_loop>) to provide task boundaries.
  • Capability inventory: The orchestrator can execute shell commands via a relay script, read/write repository files, and commit changes using git.
  • Sanitization: The workflow includes mandatory human review and the re-execution of project gates (tests, linting, builds) to verify implementer output before committing changes.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation guides the user to install the opencode-ai package via NPM and references the amElnagdy/delegate-skills repository. These community resources are outside the trusted organization scope.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's operation is based on the execution of local shell commands and a Node.js relay script that orchestrates the OpenCode CLI implementer.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 10, 2026, 08:16 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — opencode-delegate