pagespeed-enhancer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted external data (Lighthouse/PageSpeed reports) provided by the user in Phase 1. An attacker could theoretically embed malicious instructions within these reports to influence the agent's subsequent recommendations.
- Ingestion points: The
PHASE 1 — Ingest & Classifysection describes extracting data from pasted text, screenshots, or URLs provided by the user. - Boundary markers: The skill body does not specify the use of delimiters (like XML tags or triple quotes) or explicit instructions for the agent to ignore directives found within the analyzed data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to generate shell commands (e.g., for image conversion and icon resizing) and provide configuration changes for deployment files like
netlify.tomlandvercel.jsonbased on the input. - Sanitization: There are no explicit instructions provided to sanitize or validate the content of the ingested reports.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides several shell command snippets for common performance tasks.
- Evidence: Instructions in
Fix Batch 1include commands forcwebp,sharp(via Node.js),sips(macOS built-in), andpython3(using thePillowlibrary). These are provided as code examples for the user to execute manually in their environment. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill references external assets and services for performance optimization.
- Evidence: Section
F1.8suggests downloading font files from Google Fonts (fonts.googleapis.com), which is a well-known and trusted service. SectionF3.1mentions theapi.rss2json.comservice as an example of an external API call that might be present in a user's critical path.
Audit Metadata