performance-tuning
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 28, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill instructions require root or sudo access to perform tuning operations.
- Evidence includes modification of kernel parameters via
sysctland hardware-level settings in/sys/devices/system/cpu/and/sys/block/. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill provides instructions for maintaining performance configurations across system reboots.
- Evidence includes creating persistent udev rules in
/etc/udev/rules.d/60-io-scheduler.rulesand systemd services in/etc/systemd/system/cpu-governor.service. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a wide array of system monitoring and benchmarking tools.
- Evidence includes shell execution of
top,htop,mpstat,iostat,perf,fio,sysbench, andiperf3. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a vulnerability surface where it processes untrusted data from system monitoring tools and external benchmarking results.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through the outputs of
top,htop,mpstat,pidstat,iostat,iotop,sar,perf,fio,sysbench, andiperf3(SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None identified in the provided instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for kernel state modification (
sysctl), system file writes (/etc/udev/rules.d/,/etc/systemd/system/), and service management (systemctl,udevadm) (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of tool output is described before the agent is instructed to make tuning decisions based on that output.
Audit Metadata