performance-tuning

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 28, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The skill instructions require root or sudo access to perform tuning operations.
  • Evidence includes modification of kernel parameters via sysctl and hardware-level settings in /sys/devices/system/cpu/ and /sys/block/.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The skill provides instructions for maintaining performance configurations across system reboots.
  • Evidence includes creating persistent udev rules in /etc/udev/rules.d/60-io-scheduler.rules and systemd services in /etc/systemd/system/cpu-governor.service.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes a wide array of system monitoring and benchmarking tools.
  • Evidence includes shell execution of top, htop, mpstat, iostat, perf, fio, sysbench, and iperf3.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has a vulnerability surface where it processes untrusted data from system monitoring tools and external benchmarking results.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through the outputs of top, htop, mpstat, pidstat, iostat, iotop, sar, perf, fio, sysbench, and iperf3 (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the provided instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities for kernel state modification (sysctl), system file writes (/etc/udev/rules.d/, /etc/systemd/system/), and service management (systemctl, udevadm) (SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of tool output is described before the agent is instructed to make tuning decisions based on that output.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 28, 2026, 01:22 AM