pi-web-search
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses imperative language ("CRITICAL", "MUST", "No exceptions") to override standard tool behavior by forcing the agent to set
workflow: "none", which is designed to suppress interactive browser curator popups and reduce user oversight. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a shell-based fallback mechanism using
curlto query the DeepAPI service. It also explicitly suggests that the agent usereadorbashto explore local directories containing cloned content from GitHub repositories. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill instructs the agent to transmit an environment variable containing a sensitive credential (
$DEEPAPI_API_KEY) to an external, non-whitelisted domain (deepapi.co) via a shell command. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection:
- Ingestion points: Processes untrusted external data from search result synthesized answers, raw web page markdown, PDF-to-markdown extracts, and YouTube transcripts.
- Boundary markers: There are no instructions provided to use delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded within the fetched content.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to shell execution (
bash), file reading (read), and network operations (curl), which could be leveraged if the agent obeys instructions found in the external data. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the fetched content is specified before the data is processed or stored.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill performs remote data acquisition beyond standard API calls, including cloning repositories from GitHub and extracting transcripts and frames from YouTube videos using external utilities.
Audit Metadata