polis-protocol
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the user to execute multiple Python and shell scripts downloaded from an external GitHub repository, including
scripts/init_polis.py,scripts/demo.sh, andscripts/route_contract.py. These scripts perform file system operations, such as writing configuration files to the project root and the.agents/skills/directory. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The protocol framework and its dependencies are fetched from a community-managed GitHub repository (
yehudalevy-collab/polis-protocol) and an unverified package on PyPI (polis-protocol). - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a routing and governance model that integrates agent-generated outputs into its decision-making core.
- Ingestion points: The agent processes and incorporates data from markdown files in
_polis/contracts/and_polis/citizens/into the_polis/CONSTITUTION.mdand the router's history. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are documented for the incorporation of settled work lessons into the routing logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill executes Python scripts with file-write permissions across the project and agent skill directories.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation for agent-proposed "amendments" or "lessons" before they are filed and used to influence future agent routing and protocol rules.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: The internal metadata in
SKILL.mdidentifies the author asyehudalevy-collab, which conflicts with the platform-provided author context (sickn33). This discrepancy could lead to confusion regarding the provenance and security review status of the external code.
Audit Metadata