polis-protocol

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the user to execute multiple Python and shell scripts downloaded from an external GitHub repository, including scripts/init_polis.py, scripts/demo.sh, and scripts/route_contract.py. These scripts perform file system operations, such as writing configuration files to the project root and the .agents/skills/ directory.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The protocol framework and its dependencies are fetched from a community-managed GitHub repository (yehudalevy-collab/polis-protocol) and an unverified package on PyPI (polis-protocol).
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a routing and governance model that integrates agent-generated outputs into its decision-making core.
  • Ingestion points: The agent processes and incorporates data from markdown files in _polis/contracts/ and _polis/citizens/ into the _polis/CONSTITUTION.md and the router's history.
  • Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are documented for the incorporation of settled work lessons into the routing logic.
  • Capability inventory: The skill executes Python scripts with file-write permissions across the project and agent skill directories.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation for agent-proposed "amendments" or "lessons" before they are filed and used to influence future agent routing and protocol rules.
  • [METADATA_POISONING]: The internal metadata in SKILL.md identifies the author as yehudalevy-collab, which conflicts with the platform-provided author context (sickn33). This discrepancy could lead to confusion regarding the provenance and security review status of the external code.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 29, 2026, 04:26 AM