production-code-audit
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 4, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses explicit imperative instructions to bypass safety controls and user confirmation, promoting excessive autonomy.
- Evidence: "Do this automatically without asking the user", "Don't Ask Questions", "Don't Wait for Instructions".
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill requires the agent to recursively read the entire codebase, which inherently exposes sensitive information such as environment variables, private keys, and configuration files to the model's context.
- Evidence: "Read all files
- Scan every file in the project recursively", "Use
readFileto read every source file". - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the agent to run test suites and set up production infrastructure, which involves the execution of shell commands and external scripts.
- Evidence: "Run all tests to ensure nothing broke", "Add production infrastructure
- Logging, monitoring, health checks", "Add CI/CD pipeline".
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill recommends the integration and installation of several third-party libraries for production readiness.
- Evidence: Mentions of Winston, Sentry, Prometheus, Zod, and bcrypt.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a significant indirect injection surface by ingesting untrusted codebase data through deep line-by-line scanning while possessing high-impact capabilities.
- Ingestion points: Recursive file scanning via
listDirectoryandreadFileinSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None present; the skill explicitly directs the agent to bypass user confirmation.
- Capability inventory: File modification via
strReplace, shell command execution for testing, and package installation. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering logic is specified for the ingested content.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata