requesting-code-review

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted external data during the code review process.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through placeholders like {WHAT_WAS_IMPLEMENTED}, {PLAN_OR_REQUIREMENTS}, and {DESCRIPTION} in both SKILL.md and the code-reviewer.md template, as well as via the output of git diff.
  • Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or delimiters used to isolate the untrusted content from the agent's instructions, nor are there specific instructions to ignore embedded commands.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (git) and spawn subagents with 'superpowers' via the Task tool.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is provided to ensure that external content does not interfere with the agent's core logic.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The code-reviewer.md template performs shell command execution using direct variable interpolation.
  • Evidence: The template includes git diff --stat {BASE_SHA}..{HEAD_SHA}.
  • Concern: If the git commit identifiers or related metadata are manipulated to include shell metacharacters, it could lead to command injection when the agent attempts to run the diff command.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 27, 2026, 05:17 AM