requesting-code-review
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted external data during the code review process.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent's context through placeholders like
{WHAT_WAS_IMPLEMENTED},{PLAN_OR_REQUIREMENTS}, and{DESCRIPTION}in bothSKILL.mdand thecode-reviewer.mdtemplate, as well as via the output ofgit diff. - Boundary markers: There are no boundary markers or delimiters used to isolate the untrusted content from the agent's instructions, nor are there specific instructions to ignore embedded commands.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (
git) and spawn subagents with 'superpowers' via theTasktool. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is provided to ensure that external content does not interfere with the agent's core logic.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
code-reviewer.mdtemplate performs shell command execution using direct variable interpolation. - Evidence: The template includes
git diff --stat {BASE_SHA}..{HEAD_SHA}. - Concern: If the git commit identifiers or related metadata are manipulated to include shell metacharacters, it could lead to command injection when the agent attempts to run the diff command.
Audit Metadata