screenshots

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 31, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill explicitly instructs the agent in Step 2 to ask users for their email/username and password if the application requires authentication. These credentials are then hardcoded into a temporary Node.js script (screenshot-script.mjs) in plain text.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Step 6 involves generating a Node.js script by interpolating variables (URL, credentials, and page paths) into a template and executing it using node screenshot-script.mjs. This pattern of runtime script generation and execution can be vulnerable to code injection if the interpolated values contain malicious characters designed to escape string literals.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: Step 3 instructs the agent to read various untrusted files within the codebase, including README.md, CHANGELOG.md, and routing configuration files (e.g., routes.rb, urls.py).
  • Ingestion points: Project documentation and framework-specific routing files.
  • Boundary markers: None; the agent is told to "Actually read these files" to understand features.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (node, npm, npx) and control a browser via Playwright (navigation, clicks, form filling).
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the content read from the codebase is performed before it is used to plan automation steps.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: While the intended use is legitimate, the combination of requesting user passwords and then navigating a browser to a user-provided or codebase-discovered URL creates a significant risk for credential harvesting if the agent is directed to an attacker-controlled endpoint.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jul 31, 2026, 04:34 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — screenshots