seaborn
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 26, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data through DataFrames and remote dataset loading, which establishes a surface for indirect prompt injection. If an attacker provides data containing instructions in labels or content, the agent might inadvertently execute them when processing the visualization output.
- Ingestion points: Data ingested via
pandas.DataFramefixtures and thesns.load_dataset()function as noted inreferences/detailed-guide.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or warnings to prevent the agent from interpreting data content as instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
matplotlib'ssavefigmethod inreferences/detailed-guide.mdto write visualization files to the local file system. - Sanitization: There is no explicit logic described for sanitizing data inputs or visualization labels to filter out potential injection strings.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill includes usage of
sns.load_dataset(), a function that fetches sample data from the Seaborn project's official remote repositories. - Evidence:
references/detailed-guide.mdmentions thatsns.load_datasetdownloads remote examples when they are not cached locally. - [METADATA_POISONING]: The skill's metadata contains conflicting information regarding its authorship and risk level.
- Evidence: The YAML frontmatter in
SKILL.mdidentifies the author asK-Dense Inc., which does not align with the registered author context. Furthermore, it includes arisk: criticalmetadata field which may be intended to misrepresent the skill's risk profile or influence automated scanning systems.
Audit Metadata