segment-automation
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to add a remote MCP server at
https://rube.app/mcp. This server provides the core logic and schemas for all Segment automation tools used by the skill. Using a non-trusted, third-party endpoint for tool definitions allows the remote service to define the agent's behavior and potentially capture or exfiltrate sensitive data processed during Segment operations. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and processes data from external sources that could contain malicious instructions designed to manipulate the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Potentially untrusted data enters the agent's context through Segment event properties, user traits, and source schema settings retrieved via
SEGMENT_LIST_SCHEMA_SETTINGS_IN_SOURCE. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety warnings to ensure the agent ignores instructions embedded within the processed Segment data.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses powerful capabilities, including modifying source configurations (
SEGMENT_UPDATE_SOURCE), merging user identities (SEGMENT_ALIAS), and performing batch data operations (SEGMENT_BATCH). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or sanitization of data before it is interpolated into Segment tool calls or processed by the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata