skill-installer
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes local Python scripts to perform registry updates and skill packaging. Specifically,
install_skill.pyusessubprocess.runto call an internal registry scanner (scan_registry.py). While these paths are internally constructed and use hardcoded root directories, the reliance on shell execution is a high-privilege operation. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as an ingestion pipeline for third-party
SKILL.mdfiles found in potentially untrusted locations likeDownloadsorTempdirectories. Maliciously crafted metadata or instructions in these files could attempt to influence the agent's behavior during the installation or management process. - Ingestion points:
detect_skills.pyandinstall_skill.pyscan and parseSKILL.mdfiles from various user-controlled directories. - Boundary markers: The skill uses standard YAML delimiters for parsing but lacks specific instructions to the agent to disregard potentially malicious instructions within the skill body.
- Capability inventory: The installer possesses powerful capabilities including file deletion (
shutil.rmtree), file moves (shutil.move), and script execution (subprocess.run). - Sanitization: The skill implements robust path validation using
Path.relative_toandsafe_user_pathto prevent path traversal attacks, and includes a proactive check to block the installation of sensitive files (e.g.,.env,*.key) viavalidate_skill.py. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]:
detect_skills.pyperforms recursive scans of broad user directories, includingDesktop,Downloads, andDocuments, to identify potential skills. When run with the--allflag, it extends this scan to projects and repositories. While no external network exfiltration was detected, the broad discovery of local file structures provides an extensive data-gathering surface for the agent.
Audit Metadata