slack-automation
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from Slack messages and search results, which creates a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Message retrieval tools such as
SLACK_SEARCH_MESSAGES,SLACK_FETCH_CONVERSATION_HISTORY, andSLACK_FETCH_MESSAGE_THREAD_FROM_A_CONVERSATIONingest external content from Slack. - Boundary markers: The skill does not provide instructions for the agent to use delimiters or ignore instructions embedded within ingested messages.
- Capability inventory: The agent has capabilities to send messages (
SLACK_SEND_MESSAGE), schedule posts (SLACK_SCHEDULE_MESSAGE), and manage workspace metadata. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of message content is mentioned before it is processed by the agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions require the user to configure an external MCP server at
https://rube.app/mcp. This introduces a dependency on a third-party service for the core tool logic and definitions.
Audit Metadata