stitch-loop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the
Bashtool to executenpx serve, which downloads and runs a local development server. This is used for visual verification of generated pages. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements an autonomous 'baton-passing' loop where it reads task instructions from a local file (
.stitch/next-prompt.md) and uses them to drive its next actions. This pattern is susceptible to indirect prompt injection if the project files are influenced by untrusted external inputs. - Ingestion points: The
.stitch/next-prompt.mdfile (Step 1). - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no instructions to the agent to treat the data in the baton file as untrusted or to ignore embedded instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to high-privilege tools including
Bash,Write, andStitchMCP tools, providing significant control over the local environment and project files. - Sanitization: Absent. The
pagevariable from the baton frontmatter is used directly to construct file paths for move and write operations, and the prompt body is passed to generation tools without validation. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches content (HTML and PNG screenshots) from dynamic URLs provided by the Stitch MCP tools and saves them to the
.stitch/designs/directory. While these are expected outputs of the service, it involves the retrieval and storage of external content.
Audit Metadata