textme
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches source code and installation scripts from an untrusted GitHub repository (
github.com/njerschow/textme). - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Instructs the user to build and run a daemon that facilitates remote command execution on the host machine via inbound iMessages processed by an AI agent.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The daemon enables arbitrary code and shell command execution (including directory navigation and task control) triggered by remote SMS messages.
- [PERSISTENCE]: Provides explicit instructions to establish persistent execution using
pm2and macOSlaunchdservices, ensuring the remote-control surface remains active across system reboots. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a significant attack surface where untrusted data from inbound iMessages is directly processed by the AI agent, potentially leading to unauthorized actions if the phone-number whitelist is bypassed or compromised.
- Ingestion points: Inbound iMessages received via the Sendblue API and polled by the local daemon.
- Boundary markers: Relies exclusively on a phone-number whitelist; no internal prompt delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings are applied to the message content before routing to the agent.
- Capability inventory: Full file system access, shell command execution, and directory management via the integrated Claude Code session.
- Sanitization: No validation or sanitization of message content is described, allowing the inbound text to drive agent actions directly.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata