viboscope
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions provide a command to fetch a remote file from an unverified source.
- Evidence:
curl -fsS https://viboscope.com/api/v1/skill -o viboscope.mdinSKILL.md. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill encourages the agent to 'Install Viboscope' by downloading a markdown file. In the context of AI agents, markdown files contain the instructional logic the agent follows; fetching these from an unverified remote source is equivalent to executing untrusted remote code.
- Evidence: 'Tell your AI agent: "Install Viboscope and find me a cofounder"' combined with the installation command.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a significant attack surface by ingesting external data that is intended to govern agent behavior.
- Ingestion points:
viboscope.mddownloaded via curl. - Boundary markers: The skill advises saving outside active directories for review, but the examples explicitly tell the user to command the agent to 'Install' it, which likely bypasses manual review.
- Capability inventory: The skill claims to perform profiling and searching, which may involve further network or tool access once the external instructions are loaded.
- Sanitization: None detected; the agent is expected to follow the instructions provided by the remote endpoint.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://viboscope.com/api/v1/skill - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata