viboscope

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 29, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions provide a command to fetch a remote file from an unverified source.
  • Evidence: curl -fsS https://viboscope.com/api/v1/skill -o viboscope.md in SKILL.md.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill encourages the agent to 'Install Viboscope' by downloading a markdown file. In the context of AI agents, markdown files contain the instructional logic the agent follows; fetching these from an unverified remote source is equivalent to executing untrusted remote code.
  • Evidence: 'Tell your AI agent: "Install Viboscope and find me a cofounder"' combined with the installation command.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a significant attack surface by ingesting external data that is intended to govern agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: viboscope.md downloaded via curl.
  • Boundary markers: The skill advises saving outside active directories for review, but the examples explicitly tell the user to command the agent to 'Install' it, which likely bypasses manual review.
  • Capability inventory: The skill claims to perform profiling and searching, which may involve further network or tool access once the external instructions are loaded.
  • Sanitization: None detected; the agent is expected to follow the instructions provided by the remote endpoint.
Recommendations
  • HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://viboscope.com/api/v1/skill - DO NOT USE without thorough review
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Oct 29, 2026, 06:55 AM