voice-ai-engine-development
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture is designed to ingest external audio input which is transcribed into text and then passed to a Large Language Model (LLM) agent (e.g., in the GeminiAgent example). This processing chain represents a classic surface for indirect prompt injection, as malicious instructions could be embedded in audio to manipulate the agent's behavior once transcribed.
- Ingestion points: The
DeepgramTranscriberinexamples/complete_voice_engine.pyand the guide inreferences/detailed-guide.mddescribe receiving and processing raw audio chunks from a client for conversion into text. - Boundary markers: The implementation lacks explicit boundary markers or instructions to the LLM to ignore potentially malicious commands within the transcribed text.
- Capability inventory: While the agent is not granted high-risk capabilities like shell access or direct file-system writes, it manages conversation history and generates synthesized speech responses.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is provided for the transcribed text before it is used as input for the LLM agent.
Audit Metadata