warp-delegate
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/relay.mjsscript executes theoz(Warp Agent CLI) andgitbinaries usingnode:child_process.spawnandnode:child_process.spawnSync. - Arguments are constructed as an array and executed without a shell (
shell: false), which prevents shell injection vulnerabilities from the brief content. - The script validates certain command-line tokens (model, profile, conversation) against a strict alphanumeric-and-limited-symbols regex (
SAFE_TOKEN). - The documentation in
references/writing-the-brief.mdwarns that the brief is visible in process lists (e.g.,ps), advising users to keep secrets out of task descriptions. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill's primary function is to ingest a user-provided "brief" and pass it as a prompt to the
ozagent, which has broad system access. - Ingestion points: Task briefs are ingested via the
--briefflag or stdin and passed as the--promptargument to theozCLI inscripts/relay.mjs. - Boundary markers: The skill includes detailed instructions in
SKILL.mdandreferences/writing-the-brief.mdon structuring briefs with a "report contract" and explicit "do not commit" commands to restrict agent behavior. - Capability inventory: The
ozagent operates with the user's local permissions, capable of reading, writing, and executing shell commands. The relay script also usesgit status --porcelainto identify modified files. - Sanitization: While the relay script sanitizes metadata flags, it does not sanitize the content of the task brief, as it is intended for interpretation by the sub-agent AI.
Audit Metadata