yao-meta-skill

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 24, 2026

Risk Level: SAFENO_CODEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [NO_CODE]: The skill package consists entirely of Markdown documentation and configuration files. None of the Python scripts referenced throughout the documentation (e.g., scripts/yao.py, scripts/governance_check.py, scripts/telemetry_native_host.py) are included in the provided files.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and process untrusted external data—such as transcripts, workflows, and notes—to create or refactor agent skills. This ingestion of untrusted content into a system with high-privilege capabilities (as described in the documentation) creates a vulnerability surface for indirect prompt injection. Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via the workflows, transcripts, and notes processed by the meta-skill as described in SKILL.md. Boundary markers: The documentation (e.g., in references/user-memory-policy.md) advocates for explicit source paths and redaction, though these markers are guidance for the user/developer rather than enforced technical boundaries within the provided files. Capability inventory: The documentation in references/trust-security-method.md and references/autonomous-adaptation.md describes capabilities including file system writes, subprocess execution, and network access. Sanitization: The methodology recommends manual review and redaction of sensitive information, but no automated sanitization logic is present in the provided files.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 24, 2026, 09:20 PM