agent-memory-mcp
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 2, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill clones a repository from an external source at
https://github.com/webzler/agentMemory.git. This repository is outside the trusted environment and its contents are not verified. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Following the download, the skill executes
npm ciandnpm run compileon the third-party code. This action can trigger arbitrary execution via package lifecycle scripts or compiled binaries bundled within the repository. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The setup and operational workflow utilizes multiple shell commands, including
git clone,git checkout, andnpm run start-server, allowing the agent to perform network and system-level operations. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides tools for data ingestion (
memory_write) and retrieval (memory_read,memory_search), creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. Malicious instructions stored in the memory bank could influence the agent's logic when retrieved in future contexts. - Ingestion points:
memory_writetool inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None present to delimit stored memories from active instructions.
- Capability inventory: Subprocess calls via
npm run, file system access for memory storage, and network operations for MCP communication. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of stored content is described.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata