agent-memory
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions include running
npm installandnpm run start-server, which executes code from a third-party community repository (webzler/agentMemory). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads and installs dependencies from a community-managed GitHub repository (
https://github.com/webzler/agentMemory/) which does not have a verified provenance. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a memory layer that imports context from
.kilocode/,.clinerules/, and.roo/directories, creating an attack surface for indirect prompt injection. - Ingestion points: Processes markdown files within project-level configuration folders.
- Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or warnings to ignore embedded instructions are provided.
- Capability inventory: Uses MCP tools to read and search this data, influencing agent logic.
- Sanitization: No sanitization of ingested markdown content is documented.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The server startup command
npm run start-server <project_id> <absolute_path_to_workspace>incorporates user-controlled variables which could be leveraged for command injection if inputs are not validated. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes a
risk: criticalfield in its metadata, which is a deceptive indicator that attempts to pre-emptively define the skill's security status.
Audit Metadata