agent-self-scheduling
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill identifies scenarios involving the processing of untrusted external data, such as summarizing emails in the Hermes scheduler examples. This creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in the data could influence agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Example commands in
SKILL.mdsuggest processing 'new emails' or 'daily standups'. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not explicitly provide or mandate the use of XML tags or delimiters to isolate untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The skill leverages
bash,cron,systemd, and various agent execution tools (claude,codex,pi,hermes) which have access to the shell and filesystem. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering logic is provided for the interpolated data.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides numerous templates and patterns for executing shell commands, including
while-sleeploops andcrontabentries. While these are presented as standard automation techniques, they facilitate the execution of arbitrary prompts and scripts in the host environment.
Audit Metadata