faf-wizard

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to install global CLI tools and MCP servers from the public NPM registry.\n
  • Evidence: npm install -g faf-cli and npx -y claude-faf-mcp@latest in SKILL.md.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The use of npx -y ...@latest constitutes a remote code execution pattern where the latest version of a package is downloaded and executed dynamically without version pinning.\n
  • Evidence: "args": ["-y", "claude-faf-mcp@latest"] in the MCP Server configuration section.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires running various shell commands to perform its core functions of detection, generation, and synchronization.\n
  • Evidence: Commands such as faf auto, faf migrate, and faf sync are central to the workflow.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from local project files to generate AI context, creating an indirect prompt injection surface where malicious instructions in project files could influence the AI.\n
  • Ingestion points: Scans README.md, package.json, Cargo.toml, and other project manifests (SKILL.md).\n
  • Boundary markers: None specified in the documentation to prevent obedience to embedded instructions.\n
  • Capability inventory: Shell command execution via the faf CLI tool and local file system access (SKILL.md).\n
  • Sanitization: No documentation indicates that external file content is sanitized before being included in the AI context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 16, 2026, 09:51 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — faf-wizard