faf-wizard
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to install global CLI tools and MCP servers from the public NPM registry.\n
- Evidence:
npm install -g faf-cliandnpx -y claude-faf-mcp@latestinSKILL.md.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The use ofnpx -y ...@latestconstitutes a remote code execution pattern where the latest version of a package is downloaded and executed dynamically without version pinning.\n - Evidence:
"args": ["-y", "claude-faf-mcp@latest"]in the MCP Server configuration section.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires running various shell commands to perform its core functions of detection, generation, and synchronization.\n - Evidence: Commands such as
faf auto,faf migrate, andfaf syncare central to the workflow.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests data from local project files to generate AI context, creating an indirect prompt injection surface where malicious instructions in project files could influence the AI.\n - Ingestion points: Scans
README.md,package.json,Cargo.toml, and other project manifests (SKILL.md).\n - Boundary markers: None specified in the documentation to prevent obedience to embedded instructions.\n
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution via the
fafCLI tool and local file system access (SKILL.md).\n - Sanitization: No documentation indicates that external file content is sanitized before being included in the AI context.
Audit Metadata