telegram-bot-messaging
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
filecommand inscripts/telegram.sh(line 155) allows the agent to send any local file to the Telegram Bot API viacurl. Since the skill does not implement a whitelist or directory restrictions for the file path, it creates a surface where sensitive data (such as SSH keys or configuration secrets) could be exfiltrated if the agent is misdirected. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script relies on shell execution of
curlandjq(lines 81-88) to process API requests. While these operations target a well-known service (Telegram), the dynamic construction of command arguments from agent-provided input presents a potential surface for command parameter manipulation. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an Indirect Prompt Injection surface via incoming Telegram messages.
- Ingestion points: Incoming message text is ingested via the
getUpdatesAPI method in theread(line 207) andask(line 269) commands. - Boundary markers: The script does not apply delimiters or clear boundary markers to the incoming text before it is returned to the agent.
- Capability inventory: The skill has significant capabilities including file system access and network transmission.
- Sanitization: The script implements a chat ID filter (
allowed_chats, line 173) to ensure messages are only processed from authorized users, which serves as a primary access control mechanism but does not analyze the content for malicious instructions.
Audit Metadata