twitter-automation

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 29, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it is designed to ingest and process untrusted content from Twitter.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through tools such as TWITTER_RECENT_SEARCH, TWITTER_FULL_ARCHIVE_SEARCH, and TWITTER_POST_LOOKUP_BY_POST_ID as described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions lack delimiters or specific directives for the agent to ignore instructions embedded within the retrieved tweet content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to perform impactful actions on the external platform, including TWITTER_CREATION_OF_A_POST and TWITTER_POST_DELETE_BY_POST_ID.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization, escaping, or validation logic for external content is specified in the workflows.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill configuration requires the addition of an external MCP server endpoint (https://rube.app/mcp) to interface with the Twitter API.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Apr 29, 2026, 12:45 AM