ab-test

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains instructions that attempt to suppress warnings or caveats in the output (‐Do not return a draft with a warning on it. The user copies the draft and leaves the warning behind, so a caveat protects you and not them.‐). Additionally, it directs the agent to skip certain tool-related steps ‐without comment‐ if a tool is missing. These instructions represent an override of default agent transparency and safety reporting behaviors.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by fetching content from external websites and public sources. This data is then written to a persistent context file (‐.agents/product-context.md‐) used by this and potentially other skills.
  • Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to ‐fetch the site or page‐ named by the user and ‐research the company yourself: their site... plus public sources.‐
  • Boundary markers: While the skill references a separate reference file (‐references/house-rules.md‐) that contains a general rule to treat fetched content as data, the skill itself does not employ specific delimiters or unique instructions to ignore embedded commands within the fetched content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill requires network reading capabilities to fetch external URLs and file-writing capabilities to update the ‐.agents/product-context.md‐ file.
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks explicit instructions to sanitize, escape, or filter the external content before it is processed and stored in the persistent context file.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 17, 2026, 02:22 PM