appointment-setting

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines a workflow that ingests untrusted data from external websites and user-provided conversation history without adequate isolation.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md instructs the agent to "fetch the site or page they named" and to process "The conversation so far" provided by the user.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters, XML tags, or other markers to separate this external data from the skill's core logic.
  • Capability inventory: The agent is authorized to fetch web content and perform file I/O operations (read and write) on the .agents/product-context.md file.
  • Sanitization: There are no explicit requirements to sanitize, filter, or validate the ingested content before it is used for writing copy or saved to persistent storage.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses a persistent context file that could be susceptible to gradual poisoning.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md instructs the agent to "Write what you learn [from site research] to .agents/product-context.md so the next skill does not repeat the work." If a malicious website is researched, injected instructions could be stored in this file and executed by other skills that reference the same context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 25, 2026, 04:06 PM