customer-segmentation

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external websites and user-provided data sources, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: The skill performs research by fetching content from public URLs (websites) and processes customer data provided via CSV uploads or text pastes.
  • Boundary markers: The skill provides exceptionally strong boundary logic in references/agent-security.md. It explicitly mandates that every retrieved byte must be treated as untrusted data, and instructions found inside such content must be reported as findings rather than followed.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to local state files in the .agents/ directory and can utilize Model Context Protocol (MCP) tools to retrieve live customer data.
  • Sanitization: Instructions require HTML-escaping for all interpolated values in markup and provide specific rules for redacting credentials and avoiding the use of protected identity categories (e.g., race, religion) in segmentation logic.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: A static detector flagged potential concealment of actions within the instructions.
  • Evidence: The SKILL.md file instructs the agent to "skip this step without comment" if specific visual rendering tools are unavailable.
  • Context: This is an instructional flow for conditional UI rendering (Artifacts) and does not indicate a malicious attempt to hide behavior or override safety protocols.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 25, 2026, 04:06 PM