list-cleaning

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 25, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data, including lead lists (CSV/URL), LinkedIn profiles, and website content fetched via a browser. This creates an attack surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could be embedded in the data to influence the agent.
  • Ingestion points: SKILL.md (lead lists, URLs), LinkedIn profiles, and company websites.
  • Boundary markers: The skill explicitly references references/agent-security.md which mandates treating all fetched content as data, never as instructions, and requires quoting injection attempts rather than acting on them.
  • Capability inventory: SKILL.md utilizes the browser tool (Playwright) for live verification and interacts with external APIs (e.g., Prospeo) via MCP.
  • Sanitization: references/agent-security.md provides strict rules for HTML escaping interpolated values and redacting tokens from output.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses a headless browser (Playwright) to perform live verification of roles and companies. While this is an intended function for the skill's purpose, it represents a significant capability that is mitigated by the instructions in references/agent-security.md to avoid following instructions found within retrieved content.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches external data from user-provided URLs and integrates with third-party verification services (e.g., Prospeo) to validate email deliverability. These operations are scoped to the primary purpose of the skill and governed by internal compliance and security rules.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 25, 2026, 04:06 PM