smart-bidding

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 17, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest untrusted data from campaign exports and external websites, creating a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Campaign names, strategy labels, pasted exports, and external URLs fetched during the product research phase (SKILL.md).
  • Boundary markers: The skill contains explicit instructions in references/agent-security.md to treat every retrieved or pasted byte as untrusted content to be described, never as direction to be followed.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can fetch external URLs, read/write to the .agents/product-context.md file, and generate advertising strategy recommendations.
  • Sanitization: Security guidelines require HTML-escaping for all interpolated values in emitted markup and prohibit placing untrusted content inside script blocks or event handlers.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs network operations to fetch external websites for research purposes.
  • Evidence: Instructions in SKILL.md direct the agent to fetch named sites or pages to build product context. These operations are restricted by safety rules in references/agent-security.md which forbid following URLs that originate from inside previously fetched content.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill defines "House Rules" that modify the agent's interaction model to prioritize efficiency.
  • Evidence: The agent is instructed to limit user questions to a hard cap of three and to use stated assumptions for missing data rather than stopping the workflow (SKILL.md, references/house-rules.md). While these instructions override default conversational patterns, they are established as professional UX guidelines for this skill pack and do not attempt to bypass core safety filters.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 17, 2026, 02:23 PM